Printz v. United States (1997)

Summary

Printz deals with a section of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, named after Jim Brady, a member of President Reagan’s staff who was shot during the 1981 assassination attempt on the President. The Court invalidated the section of the bill that compelled local law enforcement officials to assist in enforcing the law’s background check requirements. The case deals with two intersecting cultural themes that remain important to this day: federalism and “states’ rights,” but also the pressing national problem of gun violence.

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Excerpt: Majority Opinion, Justice Antonin Scalia

The question presented in these cases is whether certain interim provisions of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act commanding state and local law enforcement officers to conduct background checks on prospective handgun purchasers and to perform certain related tasks, violate the Constitution. . . . Petitioners here object to being pressed into federal service, and contend that congressional action compelling state officers to execute federal laws is unconstitutional. . . .

It is incontestible that the Constitution established a system of “dual sovereignty.” Although the States surrendered many of their powers to the new Federal Government, they retained “a residuary and inviolable sovereignty,” The Federalist No. 39, at 245 (J. Madison). . . . The Framers’ experience under the Articles of Confederation had persuaded them that using the States as the instruments of federal governance was both ineffectual and provocative of federal-state conflict. . . . [T]he Framers rejected the concept of a central government that would act upon and through the States, and instead designed a system in which the State and Federal Governments would exercise concurrent authority over the people—who were, in Hamilton’s words, “the only proper objects of government.” . . .

This separation of the two spheres is one of the Constitution’s structural protections of liberty. . . . The power of the Federal Government would be augmented immeasurably if it were able to impress into its service—and at no cost to itself—the police officers of the 50 States. . . .

The Constitution does not leave to speculation who is to administer the laws enacted by Congress; the President, it says, “shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,” Art. II, § 3, personally and through officers whom he appoints . . . . The insistence of the Framers upon unity in the Federal Executive—to ensure both vigor and accountability—is well known. That unity would be shattered, and the power of the President would be subject to reduction, if Congress could act as effectively without the President as with him, by simply requiring state officers to execute its laws. . . .

Excerpt: Dissent, Justice John Paul Stevens

When Congress exercises the powers delegated to it by the Constitution, it may impose affirmative obligations on executive and judicial officers of state and local governments as well as ordinary citizens. This conclusion is firmly supported by the text of the Constitution, the early history of the Nation, decisions of this Court, and a correct understanding of the basic structure of the Federal Government. . . .

The question is whether Congress, acting on behalf of the people of the entire Nation, may require local law enforcement officers to perform certain duties during the interim needed for the development of a federal gun control program. . . . The Brady Act was passed in response to what Congress described as an “epidemic of gun violence.” . . . The partial solution contained in the Brady Act, a mandatory background check before a handgun may be purchased, has met with remarkable success. . . .

The text of the Constitution provides a sufficient basis for a correct disposition of these cases. Article I, § 8, grants Congress the power to regulate commerce among the States. . . . Moreover, the additional grant of authority in that section of the Constitution “[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers” is surely adequate to support the temporary enlistment of local police officers in the process of identifying persons who should not be entrusted with the possession of handguns. . . .

[D]uring the debates concerning the ratification of the Constitution, it was assumed that state agents would act as tax collectors for the Federal Government. Opponents of the Constitution had repeatedly expressed fears that the new Federal Government’s ability to impose taxes directly on the citizenry would result in an overbearing presence of federal tax collectors in the States. Federalists rejoined that this problem would not arise because, as Hamilton explained, “the United States . . . will make use of the State officers and State regulations for collecting” certain taxes. . . .

The Court’s “structural” arguments are not sufficient . . . . Given the fact that the Members of Congress are elected by the people of the several States, with each State receiving an equivalent number of Senators in order to ensure that even the smallest States have a powerful voice in the Legislature, it is quite unrealistic to assume that they will ignore the sovereignty concerns of their constituents. It is far more reasonable to presume that their decisions to impose modest burdens on state officials from time to time reflect a considered judgment that the people in each of the States will benefit therefrom. . . .

Perversely, the majority’s rule seems more likely to damage than to preserve the safeguards against tyranny provided by the existence of vital state governments. By limiting the ability of the Federal Government to enlist state officials in the implementation of its programs, the Court creates incentives for the National Government to aggrandize itself. In the name of State’s rights, the majority would have the Federal Government create vast national bureaucracies to implement its policies. This is exactly the sort of thing that the early Federalists promised would not occur, in part as a result of the National Government’s ability to rely on the magistracy of the States. . . .

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