Supreme Court Case

Harlow v. Fitzgerald (1982)

457 U.S. 800 (1982)

A. Ernest Fitzgerald head-and-shoulders portrait, seated in front of U.S. flag created by the United States Air Force.
A. Ernest Fitzgerald
United States Air Force
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“[O]ur decisions consistently have held that government officials are entitled to some form of immunity from suits for damages. As recognized at common law, public officers require this protection to shield them from undue interference with their duties and from potentially disabling threats of liability. . . . We therefore hold that government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

Selected by

Caroline Fredrickson

Visiting Professor, Georgetown University Law Center and Senior Fellow at the Brennan Center for Justice

Ilan Wurman

Associate Professor, Sandra Day O'Connor College of Law at Arizona State University

Summary

Harlow deals with “qualified immunity,” one of the most important doctrines shielding government officials—in particular, police officers—from paying damages for their misconduct. Harlow was decided in an era when crime rates were the focus of political debate and at a time when the civil rights movement had achieved many political gains. The case dealt not with police officers, however, but rather the conduct of two White House staffers from the Nixon Administration. There has in recent years been renewed debate over qualified immunity and its contribution to a system of policing that arguably impacts minority communities disproportionately.

Read the Full Opinion

Excerpt: Majority Opinion, Justice Lewis Powell

. . . . [O]ur decisions consistently have held that government officials are entitled to some form of immunity from suits for damages. As recognized at common law, public officers require this protection to shield them from undue interference with their duties and from potentially disabling threats of liability.

Our decisions have recognized immunity defenses of two kinds. For officials whose special functions or constitutional status requires complete protection from suit, we have recognized the defense of “absolute immunity.” The absolute immunity of legislators, in their legislative functions, and of judges, in their judicial functions, now is well settled. Our decisions also have extended absolute immunity to certain officials of the Executive Branch. These include prosecutors and similar officials, executive officers engaged in adjudicative functions, and the President of the United States.

For executive officials in general, however, our cases make plain that qualified immunity represents the norm. . . . [W]e explained that the recognition of a qualified immunity defense . . . reflected an attempt to balance competing values: not only the importance of a damages remedy to protect the rights of citizens, but also “the need to protect officials who are required to exercise their discretion and the related public interest in encouraging the vigorous exercise of official authority.” . . .

The resolution of immunity questions inherently requires a balance between the evils inevitable in any available alternative. In situations of abuse of office, an action for damages may offer the only realistic avenue for vindication of constitutional guarantees. It is this recognition that has required the denial of absolute immunity to most public officers. At the same time, however, it cannot be disputed seriously that claims frequently run against the innocent as well as the guilty—at a cost not only to the defendant officials, but to society as a whole. These social costs include the expenses of litigation, the diversion of official energy from pressing public issues, and the deterrence of able citizens from acceptance of public office. Finally, there is the danger that fear of being sued will “dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible [public officials], in the unflinching discharge of their duties.” . . .

[W]e conclude today that bare allegations of malice should not suffice to subject government officials either to the costs of trial or to the burdens of broad-reaching discovery. We therefore hold that government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. . . .  If the law was clearly established, the immunity defense ordinarily should fail, since a reasonably competent public official should know the law governing his conduct. . . .

By defining the limits of qualified immunity essentially in objective terms, we provide no license to lawless conduct. The public interest in deterrence of unlawful conduct and in compensation of victims remains protected by a test that focuses on the objective legal reasonableness of an official’s acts. . . .


 
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